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TREATED WITH RESPECT: ENFORCING PATIENT
AUTONOMY BY DEFENDING ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES
Carol J. Wessels*
The right of competent individuals to direct their own

health care, and even to refuse treatment, has been recognized as
a right arising not only from the common law doctrine of
informed consent, but also from the constitutional dimension.'
Enforcement of that right becomes more complex, however,
when an individual has made such direction in the form of an
advance directive, such as a power of attorney for health care or
a living will. In the context of an advance directive, the agent,
not the patient, carries out the patient's wishes with respect to
health care.
Under the Federal Patient Self Determination Act, 2 enacted
in 1991, all hospitals, nursing facilities, home health agencies,
hospice programs, and certain health maintenance organizations
participating in Medicare and Medicaid programs must comply
with certain requirements concerning advance directives. The
requirements these entities must comply with are the following:
1) provide patients with written information about
their rights under state law, including the individual's
rights to accept or refuse medical treatment and to give
advance directives;
2) provide patients with written information
concerning the written policies of the provider or
organization with respect to advance directives;
Attorney Carol J. Wessels focuses her solo practice on elder law,
guardianship, advance directives, estate planning, and civil litigation. She
supervised the SeniorLAW program at Legal Action of Wisconsin in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin from 1997 to 2004 and was a staff attorney at the Elder
Law Center of the Coalition of Wisconsin Aging Groups in Madison from
1994 to 1997. She practices in Cedarburg, Wisconsin. The author thanks
Maureen Kwiecinski, Marquette Law School, for the research and
memorandum that provide the basis for this article.
1. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(f)(a)(1) (2005).
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3) document in a prominent part of the individual's
current medical record whether the individual has
executed an advance directive;
4) ensure compliance with state law respecting advance
directives; and
5) provide education for the staff and the community
on issues concerning advance directives.3
While this legislation does not mandate states to enact
advance directives laws, it ensures that health care providers
will make patients aware of their rights with respect to the
creation and execution of such documents where state laws
exist. All states currently have legislation of some sort
authorizing competent adults to direct the medical care they
would receive if they are later incapacitated by an illness or
injury.4
Generally, an advance directive5 is a document that is
executed according to certain formalities, which may be
established by state law; it provides for health care decisions to
be made on behalf of the individual if and when the individual
is not capable of making his or her own choices or is not capable
of making those choices known. Advance directives primarily
fall into two categories: instruction directive or agent-driven
(proxy) directive.
An instruction directive6 is a document that contains, in
written form, specific directions concerning a person's desires
for health care treatment. A living will7, which describes the
person's preferences regarding end-of-life care, is an example of
an instruction directive. An agent-driven (proxy) directive,
often called a health care power of attorney, appoints an agent,
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(w) (2005).
4. Bretton J. Horton, A Survey of Living Will and Advanced Health Care Directives,
74 N.D. L. REV. 233, 233 (1998).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 57 (8th ed. 2004), advance directive: "a document that
takes effect upon one's incompetency and designates a surrogate decision-maker for
healthcare matters."
6. Id. at 813, instruction directive: "a document that contains specific directions
concerning the declarant's wishes for healthcare decisions."
7. Id. at 953, living will: "an instrument, signed with the formalities statutorily
required for a will, by which a person directs that his or her life not be artificially prolonged
by extraordinary measures when there is no reasonable expectation of recovery from
extreme physical or mental disability."
8. Id. at 57, 1263, proxy directive: "a document that appoints a surrogate decisionmaker for the declarant's healthcare decisions."
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or attorney-in-fact, to act in the place of the individual when the
individual is no longer capable of making their own health care
decisions. Agent-driven (proxy) directives may also include
specific instructions with respect to the individual's desires.9 In
most states, if the agent-driven directive includes instructions to
the agent, the agent must follow those instructions.10 If the
directive does not include instructions, the agent may be
required to make decisions using either "substituted judgment"
or "best interest" as the standard for decision making."
Elder law attorneys frequently draft advance directives as
part of a comprehensive planning process for aging clients.
While drafting the document may be a simple process,
enforcement is not. On the premise that the execution of an
advance directive is a constitutional right, this article explores
impediments to that right and how those impediments may be
overcome. This article focuses on advance directives that are
validly drafted and have a properly motivated agent; situations
where the validity of the document or the motivations of the
agent are called into question are equally important, but not
discussed here.
The problems with advance directives can be sorted into
three categories: 1) statutory limits on what authority a principal
may give to an agent; 2) statutory provisions restricting the
execution of a valid directive; and 3) providers refusing or
failing to act on an agent's direction. In all three situations,
enforcement of the document begins with recognition of the
legal principles that are implicated in the creation of an advance
directive.
LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT TO MAKE AN ADVANCE
DIRECTIVE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Each individual has a fundamental right under the federal
constitution to direct his or her own health care. Over a century
ago, the Supreme Court recognized that "[n]o right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
9. Id. at 57.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." 12 This
right arises out of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that "[n]o State shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 3 This liberty interest guarantees that "[e]very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body." 14
Likewise, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment.'- The right to direct one's own health care also arises
in the constitutional guarantee of personal privacy. The U.S.
Constitution does not expressly mention a right of privacy.
Nonetheless, "the [Supreme] Court has recognized that a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution."' 6 This right to
privacy emanates from the penumbra of specific guarantees of
particular amendments to the Constitution. 7 The boundaries of
this right have not been clearly defined; however, "personal
rights found in this guarantee of personal privacy must be
limited to those which are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' .... "1' These fundamental rights are

not lost when an individual becomes incompetent or
incapacitated: "[T]he constitutional right of privacy would be an
empty right if one who is incompetent were not granted the
right of a competent counterpart to exercise his rights." 9
12. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); cited with
approval in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.

15. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 262; see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (right
to refuse live-saving medical treatment is grounded on "well established, traditional rights to
bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching"); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (right to refuse unwanted medical treatment "may be inferred from our
prior decisions").
16. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
17. Id.
18. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
19. In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1984). See
also In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (Wash. 1983); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (holding that a severely retarded man enjoyed liberty interests in safety
and bodily restraint); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 (incompetent patients enjoy "constitutionally
protected interests" under the Due Process Clause); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976),
cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. N.J., 429 U.S. 922 (1976) ("If a putative decision by Karen
to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded
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However, concern is raised that the assertion that an
incompetent person maintains the same rights as a competent
individual "begs the question: an incompetent person is not able
to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a
hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a
'right' must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of
surrogate." 20 Thus, with respect to an advance directive, the
argument should be framed on the premise that when a
competent person exercises the right to direct his or her health
care through execution of an advance directive, the action
encompassed by fundamental constitutional rights is the
execution of the document itself. This right is not lost by
incompetence or incapacity that generally is required for the
document to become effective.
Where a state seeks to regulate these "fundamental rights,"
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be
justified only by a "compelling state interest," 21 and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.22 It is difficult to conceive
of any compelling state interest that would justify the negation
of the right of an individual to execute an advance directive.
The court in Cruzan left open the question as to whether states
are constitutionally required to implement the decisions of a
named health care surrogate.23 As a practical matter, where an
as a valuable incident of her right to privacy ... then it should not be discarded solely on the
basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice.").
20. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
21. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). See also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
22. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S.479, 485 (1965). See also Aptheker v. Sec'y of State,
378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
23. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring):
I also write separately to emphasize that the Court does not today decide the issue
whether a State must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate
decisionmaker. See [Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287,] n. 12. In my view, such a duty
may well be constitutionally required to protect the patient's liberty interest in
refusing medical treatment. Few individuals provide explicit oral or written
instructions regarding their intent to refuse medical treatment should they become
incompetent. States, which decline to consider any evidence other than such
instructions, may frequently fail to honor a patient's intent. Such failures might be
avoided if the State considered an equally probative source of evidence: the
patient's appointment of a proxy to make health care decisions on her behalf.
Delegating the authority to make medical decisions to a family member or friend
is becoming a common method of planning for the future. See, e.g., Areen, The
Legal Status ofConsent Obtained from Families ofAdult Patients to Withhold or

Withdraw Treatment, 258 JAMA 229, 230 (1987). Several States have recognized
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advance directive is clear and detailed, the principal's exercise of
his or her constitutional right should not be questioned.
It is recognized however, that where an agent is exercising
an individual's right to direct health care, "safeguards" may be
effectuated by states in light of the states' interests, such as the
preservation of human life and guarding against abuse by
surrogates. 24 At the same time, the delineation between an
appropriate "safeguard" and an illegal restriction of a patient's
autonomy is a boundary that warrants close examination when
the decisions of an agent, or the authority of the principal to
delegate decisions to the agent, are restricted by state statute.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

In addition to federal constitutional rights to direct health
care decisions, a state constitutional right may exist. A number
of states have recognized that their state constitutions provide a
the practical wisdom of such a procedure by enacting durable power of attorney
statutes that specifically authorize an individual to appoint a surrogate to make
medical treatment decisions. Some state courts have suggested that an agent
appointed pursuant to a general durable power of attorney statute would also be
empowered to make health care decisions on behalf of the patient. See, e.g., In re
Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 378-379, 529 A.2d 419, 426 (1987); see also 73 Op.Md. Atty.
Gen. No. 88-046 (1988) (interpreting Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann. §§ 13-601 to
13-602 (1974), as authorizing a delegate to make health care decisions). Other
States allow an individual to designate a proxy to carry out the intent of a living
will. These procedures for surrogate decisionmaking, which appear to be rapidly
gaining in acceptance, may be a valuable additional safeguard of the patient's
interest in directing his medical care. Moreover, as patients are likely to select a
family member as a surrogate, see 2 President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Making
Health Care Decisions 240 (1982), giving effect to a proxy's decisions may also
protect the "freedom of personal choice in matters of ... family life." Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974).
Today's decision, holding only that the Constitution permits a State to require
clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's desire to have artificial
hydration and nutrition withdrawn, does not preclude a future determination that
the Constitution requires the States to implement the decisions of a patient's duly
appointed surrogate. Nor does it prevent States from developing other approaches
for protecting an incompetent individual's liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment. As is evident from the Court's survey of state court decisions, see ante
at 2847-2851 no national consensus has yet emerged on the best solution for this
difficult and sensitive problem. Today we decide only that one State's practice
does not violate the Constitution; the more challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests is entrusted to the
"laboratory" of the States, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), in the first instance.
24. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 353.
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right to privacy that includes a right to direct health care
decisions. 25 "Constitutions in ten states-Alaska, Arizona,
California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South
Carolina, and Washington-expressly recognize a right to
privacy." 26
The recognition of a state constitutional right to make a will
should also support the position that an individual has the right
to create a directive as to his or her health care. 27 Where an
individual's right to control the distribution of his or her
property after death is recognized as a fundamental right, the
right to control his or her health care while alive is certainly no
less significant.
COMMON LAW INFORMED CONSENT

In conjunction with the fundamental rights discussed
above, the common law doctrine of informed consent also
supports an individual's right to make health care decisions. 28
The notion of an individual's right to the possession and control
of his own person has been embodied in the requirement that
informed consent is generally required for medical treatment.
This doctrine places a duty on physicians to disclose material
information to a patient in order for the patient to make an
informed decision regarding medical treatment and to obtain the
patient's consent to treatment. 29 The doctrine of informed
consent also allows an individual to forego all treatment
entirely. 0 Like the rights described previously, the common law
25. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (right to withdraw life-sustaining measures
grounded in state constitutional right to privacy). AccordIn re Guardianship of Browning,
568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Bouvia v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); In re
Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 741 (Wash. 1983); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (N.J.
1987); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. App.), review denied 492 So. 2d
1331 (1986).
26. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG., PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (2004), at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/stateconstpriv03.htm
(last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
27. See, e.g., In re Ogg's Estate 54 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Wis. 1952) ("[E]very person of
mature age and sound mind has a right, conformably to statutory regulations designed to
safeguard such right, to make his own will, and have it carried out according to his intent;
and the constitutional right to make a will includes the right to have a valid will so given
effect as to enforce the intention of the testator.").
28. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
29. Id at 269.
30. Idat 306.
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right can also be delegated to and exercised by a third party.
STATUTORY BARRIERS TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES
STATUTES RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY TO BE GRANTED

In conflict with the right to direct one's own health care
through the execution of an advance directive are laws within
the statutory authority itself that limit the extent of authority
that can be granted. Limiting laws may be based on the nature
of the treatment involved or the nature of the individual's
disability.
Statutory limitations on the authority of an agent frequently
arise in the context of mental health treatment.3 '
Such
limitations are found in Wisconsin law, including a law that
precludes an agent's authority to consent to mental health
treatment, such as electroconvulsive therapy (shock treatment),
and a law that prevents an agent from authorizing a nursing
home admission for long-term care-a decision that can
otherwise be made by the agent if authority is granted in the
document-when the principal has been diagnosed with a

mental illness. 32
Where the law restricts the kinds of decisions an agent may
make, the constitutional analysis as to whether the restriction is
based on a compelling state interest should be applied. As the
Cruzan court implied, a specifically worded directive should
prevail over any purported state interest.33 Thus, it is important
to include specific direction and authority in the advance
directive, even if that direction or authority is precluded by statute.
An individual in Wisconsin, for example, who has benefited
from shock therapy and wants to give his or her agent the
authority to consent to that treatment in the future, should
include language authorizing shock treatment even though state
statute prohibits it.

31. See BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, POWER IN PLANNING: SELF
DETERMINATION THROUGH ADVANCE PSYCHIATRIC DIRECTIVES at 2 (2003).
32. WIS. STAT. § 155.20(2), (3) (2004).

33. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
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STATUTES IMPAIRING THE EXECUTION OF VALID ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES

Laws outside of the advance directive statutes may impede
the effectiveness of, or allow for the involuntary revocation of,
the documents by a person or entity other than the principal.
Wisconsin's guardianship and power of attorney statutes require
a court that orders a guardianship of the person to make a
specific finding in order for an advance directive to remain in
effect.M Similarly, the Uniform Probate Code, adopted in
eighteen states, includes a provision that gives a court-appointed
conservator the same authority to revoke or amend a durable
power of attorney, as the principal would have if competent. 35
Based on the constitutional foundation of the right to make an
advance directive, it should be argued that these statutes are
unconstitutional.
Additionally, as described below, the
revocation provisions may violate anti-discrimination laws,
because they allow third-party revocation of the document
where an individual has been found incompetent, when such
third-party revocation would not be permissible if the individual
were competent.
Where the law restricts an agent's actions or otherwise
restricts the execution of an advance directive based on the
nature of the principal's illness, the restriction may violate laws
that prohibit discrimination based upon disability. In Hargrave
v. Vermont,16 the court held that "Vermont's 'Act 114' . . .
discriminated against individuals with mental disabilities under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ... and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act... .""' The challenged Vermont law
allowed "health care professionals [to] petition in family court
for authority to medicate involuntarily individuals who have
been civilly committed or prisoners who have been judged
mentally ill.""3
Again, the lesson to be learned is that specific instructions in
34. Wis. STATS. §§ 155.60(2), 243.07(3), 880.33(3) (2004).
35. Unif. Probate Code § 5-503(a) (revised 1998). Draft amendments to Article 5 of
the UPC would allow revocation of an advance directive by a guardian only by court order.
This author was unable to determine if these draft amendments have been adopted as
archives of the committee. It is necessary to check your state's probate law to determine
whether a guardian or conservator has this power.
36. 340 F.3d 27 (2nd Cir. 2003).
37. Id. at 30.
38. Id. at 31.
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an advance directive are vital where a principal wishes to grant
authority that may be prohibited by statute. In Wisconsin, for
example, the document should state (if the principal so wishes)
"I specifically grant my agent theauthority to admit me to a
nursing facility for long term care even if I have been diagnosed
with a mental illness," or "I intend for this document to remain
in effect in its entirety even if a court appoints a guardian other
than my agent."
PROVIDER REFUSAL TO ABIDE BY THE AGENT'S DECISIONS AND
PROVIDER IMMUNITY STATUTES

The substitute decision making process can lead to the
patient's decisions being ignored for various reasons, including a
real or perceived lack of clarity in the decisions expressed by the
patient in the document, family disputes, ignorance of the
existence of the document itself, or a health care provider's
substitution of its own judgment for the agent's. In the majority
of states, if a health care provider refuses to honor a patient's
advance directive, there is no specific remedy at law. Some
states, such as Wisconsin,39 go so far as to grant civil immunity
to health care providers who fail to follow an advance
directive. 40 This leads to the criticism that, without a legal
remedy, there is no actual right to direct one's own medical care
through an advance directive. Currently, Utah is the only state
to have a penalty for failure to comply with a living will.41 In
these cases, perhaps the quickest method to secure compliance
with an advance directive is an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief under a state's civil procedure statutes.
In cases where a provider knowingly refuses to follow an
agent's direction, a variety of causes of action could be pursued.

39. While using Wisconsin law as an example, the problems discussed herein exist, to
varying degrees, nationwide.
40. WIs. STAT. § 155.50 (2004) (addresses the duties and immunities of health care
providers with respect to advance directives. Wisconsin provides broad immunity to
facilities and providers who fail to honor an advance directive). WIS. STAT. § 155.50(l)(b)
provides that a health care facility, health care provider, or a physician cannot be held
criminally or civilly liable for failure "to comply with a power of attorney for health care
instrument or the decision of a health care agent.... [A] physician [may be charged with]
unprofessional conduct [for failure to comply only if he or she also] fails to make a good
faith attempt to transfer the principle to another physician who will comply."
41. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112 (2004).
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Regardless of the theory [employed,] a plaintiff [should
be prepared] to prove that: 1) the patient executed ...
[a valid] advance directive concerning his or her
medical care ... ; 2) the health care provider had
knowledge or notice of the advance directive; 3) the
health care provider ... withheld [or instituted] care
contrary to the [plaintiff]'s instructions .. .; and
4) some ... compensable harm resulted.42
In all honesty, these theories have not yet proven to be
overwhelmingly successful, nor have all of them been litigated
in the context of an advance directive as opposed to other
surrogate decision-making situations. However, unless the issue
has been squarely decided in your jurisdiction, it should be
considered.
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

A cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress requires that the plaintiff show the following:
1) the death or serious physical injury of another was
caused by the defendant's negligence;
2) there was a marital or intimate familial relationship
between the plaintiff and the injured person;
3) the plaintiff observed the death or injury at the scene of
the accident; and
4) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a
result. 43
In Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital,"4 Jeffrey
Strachan, twenty-years-old, arrived at the defendant hospital on
a Friday evening after shooting himself in the head. 45 He was
intubated and placed on a respirator in the emergency room
(ER). 46 The ER physician declared Strachan brain dead.4 7 That
same day, a neurosurgeon also found Strachan to be clinically
42. KATHLEEN E. WHERTHEY, CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND) Vol. 16, at 83: CAUSE OF
ACTION OF RECOVER DAMAGES FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH ADVANCE DIRECTIVE (2004).

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gotshall, 512 U.S. 532, 548-49 (1994).
507 A.2d 718 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
Id. at 720.
Id.
Id.
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brain dead." That evening, the neurosurgeon explained to
Strachan's parents that nothing could be done to restore brain
function and asked if they would consider donating Strachan's
organs.49 The parents were undecided, and the neurosurgeon
suggested they give it some thought overnight."
The following morning Strachan's parents refused organ
donation and stated they wanted the respirator turned off.51 As
the day progressed, they asked a nurse and were told that no,
"nobody had ever asked to have a machine shut off."5 2 Again, in
the evening, they asked a doctor who assured them, and noted
in Strachan's chart, that the respirator could be withdrawn as
soon as the hospital administrator determined the procedure.53
The hospital contacted the administrator, who in turn contacted
the hospital's legal adviser, and the parents were told around
2:00 a.m. on Sunday that withdrawal of the respirator would
require a court order.m
In fact, however, the hospital's legal counsel had called for a
court order only if Strachan's parents requested withdrawal of
the respirator before EEGs (electroencephalograms) could be
donewith an interval of 24 hours between them, as required to
confirm irreversible brain death.55 Two such EEGs were
performed on Sunday and Monday, after which the legal adviser
told the administrator that the respirator could be turned off
with a proper release by the parents.56 On Monday, official brain
death was recorded and the parents were summoned to the
hospital.57 After they signed a release, the respirator was
disconnected.58
Strachan's parents sued for negligent infliction of emotional
distress citing the absence of consent forms and a procedure for
turning off life supports. 9 In addition, plaintiffs asserted a claim
for wrongfully withholding the body of their dead son for

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Strachan,507 A2d at 720.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 721.
Strachan,507 A2d at 721.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id. at 719.
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burial.60 Each claim resulted in a jury award of $70,000.61
However, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the
plaintiffs did not establish any actionable wrongdoing. 62 The
court found that the "principles distilled from existing law
persuade us to conclude that the hospital had no duty to provide
consent forms or to have a procedure for turning off the
respirator."6
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

The elements of a prima facie case of intentional infliction of
emotional distress are generally:
1) outrageous conduct by the defendant,
2) intent to cause or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing emotional distress,
3) severe emotional suffering, and
4) actual and proximate causation of emotional
distress. 4
"Outrageous conduct" denotes conduct which is so extreme as
to exceed all bounds of decency and which is to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.65
In Gragg v. Calandra,66 Florian Guintola, father of plaintiff
Geraldine Gragg, had a living will that expressed his wishes that
family withhold extraordinary measures to sustain his life if he
lost the ability to direct them. 67 Mr. Guintola was taken to the
ER by his wife and daughter who consented to a cardiac
catheterization during which the patient experienced cardiac
arrest.68
Unconscious and unresponsive, there was no
reasonable likelihood that Mr. Guintola would survive;
however, the defendant physicians proceeded to perform open
heart bypass surgery without the consent of Mr. Guintola's

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Strachan, 507 A2d at 719.
63. Id. at 726. Note that this case predates the Patient Self-Determination Act, which
became effective in 1991.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
66. 696 N.E.2d 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
67. Id. at 1285.
68. Id. at 1284-85.
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family. 69 Unfortunately, Mr. Guintola had suffered irreversible
brain damage during the arrest and remained unresponsive and
dependent on life support.70
In response to the family's repeated request that life support
be discontinued, the physicians involved stated that they would
not honor Mr. Guintola's living will and accused Mr. Guintola's
wife and daughter of trying to kill Mr. Guintola. Mr. Guintola
died one week after his arrival at the hospital."
The plaintiff brought an action against the hospital and the
physicians alleging, among other issues, the intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 72 The Illinois Court of Appeals concluded
that the defendant physicians "knew or had reason to know
that... [Mr. Guintola's wife and daughter] ... were extremely
distraught, yet repeatedly accused them of trying to kill [Mr.
Guintola]." 3 The court held that a jury could deem the conduct
of the defendants outrageous and, therefore, reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.74 The defendants argued that they had a
legitimate objective in sustaining Florian's life; however, the
court stated that "[a]lthough a defendant may reasonably believe
that his objective is legitimate, it does not provide him with carte
blanche to pursue that objective by outrageous means."75
In Westhart v. Mule,76 the patient Westhart was admitted to a
hospital with severe, long-term impairments, including
congestive heart failure, pneumonia, and organic brain
syndrome.77 Because he could not communicate his wife of 45
years "took it upon herself" to convey to his doctors, Joseph
Mule and Dennis Riff, his treatment decisions.78 She told the
doctors that no extraordinary measures were to be taken,
including use of a respirator or CPR because her husband was "a
vegetable."79 The doctors agreed and recorded the orders in Mr.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Gragg,696 N.E.2d at 1289.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Id.
261 Cal. Rptr. 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 641.
Id.
Id.
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Westhart's chart."
Early in March, two hospital nurses called Mrs. Westhart by
telephone and attempted to obtain her consent to the surgical
placement of a feeding tube."' According to the complaint, Mrs.
Westhart was emotionally distressed and crying hysterically
during the call. 82 The nurses disagreed over whether Mrs.
Westhart voluntarily consented, so one declined to sign the
consent form. 3 Nonetheless, the feeding tube was inserted.8
Mrs. Westhart sued for intentional infliction of emotional
distress; however, the trial court dismissed her claim without
granting leave to amend."
The appellate court affirmed
dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against the physicians.86 The court held that Mrs. Westhart's
own failure to take action to avoid life-saving treatment for
decedent foreclosed the claim, and that the conduct of which she
complained did not rise to the extreme and outrageous level. 7
BATTERY

A person commits a battery when he unlawfully strikes or
touches another. 8 In a medical setting, when a physician treats
a person without consent, a physician may be liable for battery.89
Medical treatment without consent may be lawful under the
doctrine of implied consent when a medical emergency requires
immediate action to preserve the health or life of the patient.90
However, a patient may expressly refuse a particular treatment.
If so, even in an emergency, the medical treatment is a battery.
In Allore v. Flower Hospital,91 Frank Allore, an asbestosis
patient, was admitted to the defendant hospital in June 1994.92

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Westhart, 261 Cal. Rptr. At 641.
Id.
Id. at 641-42.
Id. at 640.
Id.
Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 18 (1965).
See Gragg,696 N.E.2d at 1287.
See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 771, 788 (1972).
699 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).

92. Id. at561.
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He executed a living will directing his doctor to withhold
"life-sustaining treatment" if he was either terminal or
permanently unconscious. 93 The state statute required that the
attending and one other physician certify that the patient's
condition triggered the living will provisions.94 Mr. Allore also
executed a durable power of attorney for health care, naming his
wife Mary to make decisions if he was unable to do so. At the
time, the attending physician and the hospital knew of the
directives. 5
In August, Mr. Allore was readmitted with multiple
conditions, including severe chronic respiratory failure and
congestive heart failure. 96 He was placed in the coronary care
unit. His chart contained no Do Not Resuscitate order.97 When
he developed breathing difficulty, the attending physician
ordered no interventions but the cardiologist (contacted
subsequently by the nurse) ordered intubation." On learning of
the living will, the cardiologist provided orders eliminating
intubation and ventilation." However, the patient died about
two days after these events.1oo
Mrs. Allore brought an action alleging several claims,
including negligence and battery, among others. She asserted
that hospital and physicians were negligent in their care in that
they disregarded her husband's wishes expressed in his living
will; and that they committed a battery by the intubation and
ventilation without consent of either the patient or herself as
agent.10 She also claimed loss of consortium and "severe
emotional distress." 02
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants on all counts. 03 The appellate court affirmed,
holding that the cardiologist followed the standard of care
employed in a life-threatening situation because he was
uninformed of the living will and that there was no genuine
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 561-62.
Allore, 699 N.E.2d at 562.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 563.
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issue of material fact as to the decedent's implied consent
because the doctor was unaware of the decedent's wishes and
the decedent's primary physician had remained silent about the
living will. 104
In another case, Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Systems
10 Wright, who was suffering from complications of
Corporation,
HIV/AIDS, executed a living will in February 1993 that directed
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures
upon the determination by two physicians that the patient was
terminal and death was imminent. 06 While hospitalized, Wright
underwent a blood transfusion, and, "[w]ithin minutes [of its
completion], Wright was found unresponsive and without a
pulse." 07 Wright was resuscitated, intubated, and transferred to
an intensive care unit.108 Later the staff acknowledged the living
will as well as a note in the chart that stated, "'We will provide
comfort care and make no further attempt to reintubate or
resuscitate ... again per his expressed wishes." 0 Wright was
comatose for two days and then regained some consciousness. 10
He died ten days after his arrest."
Wright's estate and his parents asserted the following fourcount complaint against multiple defendants:
1) wrongful life, alleging the administration of CPR was
contrary to Wright's living will and that the staff failed to
make a timely exploration into Wright's wishes;
2) wrongful death, alleging Wright's suffering that resulted
from the resuscitation caused them emotional distress;
3) battery, alleging defendants engaged "intentional, nonconsensual harmful ... touching";11' and
4) lack of informed consent. 13
The circuit court entered summary judgment for the defendants
on all counts.11" The court of appeals affirmed, but did note that
an individual and his estate could assert a cause of action for a
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 564.
728 A.2d 166 (Md. 1999).
Id. at 172.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 172.
Wright, 728 A.2d at 172.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 174.
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health care provider's failure to comply with an advance
directive."'
BREACH OF CONTRACT

A family who feels that life support is continued
inappropriately may decide to withhold payment for services,
thereby breaching their contract with the health care provider.
In this circumstance, the wrongful continuation of life support
would be a defense to a breach of contract suit. Although this
theory was unsuccessful in Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v.
Elbaum,116 the decision seems to turn on the facts involved. In
the case where an advance directive exists, the theory may be
more successful.
The facts of Elbaum are as follows:
[T]he plaintiff nursing home agreed to provide
certain services to Jean Elbaum, an unconscious
patient who could not survive without artificial
nutrition and hydration, on condition that the
defendant Murray Elbaum pays for the services.
Mrs. Elbaum [did not have] a living will. Mr.
Elbaum entered into this contract knowing that the
services to be provided by the plaintiff would
include the maintenance of a gastrointestinal
feeding
tube, which had already been
inserted. . . .117
Some time later, Mr. Elbaurn demanded that the nutrition
and hydration be stopped, claiming that cessation would be in
accordance with Mrs. Elbaum's wishes if she were able to
communicate them.118 The nursing home refused, stating "that
there was no 'clear indication' of Mrs. Elbaum's [wishes] ... and

also asserting that [the nursing home's] ethical standards
would ... prohibit it from withdrawing life-saving medical
. 119 The nursing home
treatment from one of its patients ...
115. Id.; see Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984), infra
note 126 through 136 and accompanying text for a more positive outcome on a claim of
battery.
116. 588 N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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encouraged Mr. Elbaum to transfer Mrs. Elbaum to another
facility; and, while there was no evidence that Mr. Elbaum made
efforts to transfer, the nursing home did make an unsuccessful
attempt to locate another facility. 120 Other facilities "would not
admit a patient for the sole purpose of removing the [feeding]

tube."121
Mr. Elbaum then refused to pay for any of the services
provided, thereby breaching his contract with the nursing
home.122 The nursing home brought a claim for breach of
contract, and Mr. Elbaum responded with a claim of battery.123
The lower court denied the plaintiff's motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissed the
defendant's counterclaim for battery.124 The court of appeals
reversed the decision as to Mr. Elbaum's liability to pay fees and
affirmed the decision to dismiss the battery claim.1 25 The court
stated that absent a court order, the plaintiff had committed no
legal wrong and forfeited no fees.126
INFORMED CONSENT

In Estate of Leach v. Shapiro,127 Edna Marie Leach entered a
hospital in July of 1980 suffering from respiratory distress.128
Mrs. Leach took a turn for the worse, however, as the following
facts explain:
Mrs. Leach subsequently suffered a ... cardiac
arrest, and though her heartbeat was restored, she
remained in a chronic vegetative state. [She] was
placed on life-support systems to sustain her
breathing and circulation. In October 1980, Mrs.
Leach's husband, as her guardian, petitioned ... for
an order to terminate the life-support measures.
The court issued this order on December 18, 1980.
On January 6, 1981, the respirator was

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
GracePlaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Estate of Leach, 469 N.E.2d 1047.
Id. at 1051.
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disconnected, and Mrs. Leach died. 129
Mrs. Leach's survivors sued for damages for the interval of
life support, asserting
that no consent was given for the lifesupport first provided to the patient.'" The plaintiffs alleged
that Mrs. Leach was first placed on life-support systems in
August 1980, when she was already in a chronic vegetative state,
and that this treatment was performed without the consent of
Mrs. Leach or her family. 31 The plaintiffs alleged that Mrs.
Leach expressly advised the defendants that she did not wish to
be kept alive by machines and that "[a]bsent an emergency, the
defendants had an obligation to secure consent for Mrs. Leach's
treatment from one authorized to act on her behalf, since Mrs.
Leach was not capable of consenting, or by court order." 132 A
five-count complaint filed by the plaintiffs was based upon the
notion that the defendants acted wrongfully in placing and
maintaining Mrs. Leach on life-support systems contrary to the
express wishes of Mrs. Leach and her family. 33
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment, which the lower court granted without the support of
affidavits or other evidence.1 The court of appeals reversed
holding that:
1) a patient's right to refuse treatment was absolute, and the
existence of consent or refusal of treatment and the nature
of treatment provided were factual questions precluding a
motion to dismiss;
2) the claimants stated causes of action required factual
determination for non-disclosure, pain and suffering,
punitive damages, and unreasonable delay in compliance
with the court order to terminate life support; and
3) dismissal of the mental anguish claim was improper. 35
An invasion of privacy claim failed because the personal right
lapsed on the patient's death.136 The court agreed that the
doctrine of informed consent included the right to refuse
treatment and that the breach of such a duty could support an
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1053.
Estate of Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1051.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1050.
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action for battery.13 7
VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTs ACT SECTION 1983138

Recovery for a violation of an individual's constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment requires that the plaintiff
establish that 1) the physician or hospital is a state actor and 2)
the defendant hospital or physician intended to violate his or her
constitutional rights.139 If successful, there is a possibility of
recovery of attorney's fees.x40 In Gray v. Romeo,14' the plaintiff,
Glenn Gray, recovered damages under a section 1983 action for
the defendant's refusal to withdraw a feeding tube from Glenn's
wife, Marcia.142
In Gray, the patient, 37-year-old wife Marcia, was admitted
to Rhode Island Hospital, a state facility, in January 1986, with a
major cerebral hemorrhage. Despite surgery, she experienced
severe brain damage and prolonged unconsciousness.143 Twelve
days later, the patient's husband Glenn gave consent to the use
of breathing and feeding tubes.144
Marcia continued to
deteriorate to a persistent vegetative state and was transferred to
another state facility.145 After about four months, the family
asked for artificial support to be withdrawn,146 but the facility
refused citing its opposition as a matter of policy to the denial of
nutrition and hydration. 147 Staff members who cared for Marcia
joined the institution in its opposition.148
Glenn, acting as legal guardian, brought a Sec. 1983 action
for violation of his wife's civil rights, seeking an order to
withdraw her feeding tube. 49 The court held that Ms. Gray had
a constitutional right to privacy, which included a right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment, including the right to have the

137. Id.

138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2005).
Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D. R.I. 1988).
Id. at 590.
Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 582.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Gray, 697 F. Supp. at 583.
Id.
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feeding tube removed.o50 The court observed that the patient
and her family had no notice of her loss of rights to consent to
and refuse care attendant on admission to the facility.'1' The
court concluded that if Marcia could not be admitted to a facility
that would honor such choice, then this state facility that
admitted her must abide by her wishes.152
VIOLATION OF SECTION
U.S.C. SECTION 794)153

504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT (29

WRONGFUL LIFE
In Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital,M Mr. Winter

was admitted to the defendant hospital complaining of chest
pain in 1988.55 After a discussion with his physician, Mr. Winter
stated that he did not want any extraordinary lifesaving
measures and his physician entered a "No Code Blue" order on
his chart.156 However, when Mr. Winter experienced a
potentially fatal heart rhythm, a nurse defibrillated him.'57 Two
days later he suffered a stroke that left him paralyzed on the
right side until his death in 1990.158
Mr. Winter's estate alleged battery, negligence, and
wrongful life claims, stating that "by keeping [Mr.] Winter alive,
[the hospital] caused him'. . . pain, suffering, emotional distress,
and disability as well as medical and other . .. expenses."1 59 The
Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Winter had not
suffered a compensable injury from the hospital's failure to
follow the no code order. 60 The Anderson court held: "[The
estate's] attempt to create a wrongful-living cause of action fails
because life is not a compensable harm." 61 On appeal after
remand, the appellate court clarified what it meant in holding
150. Id. at 586.
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. See generally Hargrave, 340 F.3d 27.
154. 614 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), appeal after remand, 1995 WL 109128
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
155. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Anderson, 614 N.E.2d at 843.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 846.
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that wrongful living is not a compensable harm: "By that we
mean that he cannot recover general damages just for finding
himself still alive after unwanted resuscitative measures." 62
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed, stating "In its simplest
form, the question [presented by a wrongful living claim]
becomes: Is 'continued living' a compensable injury?"163 The
court concluded that it is not; even if the plaintiff could show a
breach of a duty and the resulting prolongation of life. 6 4
BATTERY

Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center,165 provides an
unsuccessful cause of action in battery for failure to withdraw
care pursuant to an advance directive. In Bartling, patient
William was admitted to the defendant hospital for treatment of
severe chronic depression, with numerous serious physical
conditions including emphysema, heart disease and lung
cancer.'66 Six days later, the patient's lung collapsed in a
procedure and he was placed on a ventilator.167 William resisted
the ventilator and had to be restrained to prevent him from
removing the tubes. 6 s
About two weeks later, William executed a living will 6 9
and a health care power of attorney naming his wife as agent.
He also stated that he found it intolerable to continue living on
the ventilator and requested it be discontinued.170 He also
executed a power of attorney for health care instrument naming
his wife as his agent.'7 1 "He, his wife and his daughter also
executed documents ... releas[ing the hospital] and its physician
from any claim of . .. liability. ... "172

The hospital refused to disconnect the ventilator but made a
number of unsuccessful attempts to wean him from the
162. Anderson, 1995 WL 109128 at 3.
163. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
164. Id.
165. 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). See also Foster v. Toutellotte, 704 F.2d
1109 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court's denial of damages and attorney's fees for
unwanted respirator care).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Bartling,229 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
172. Id at 362.

MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR

240

[Vol. 6

ventilator.173 Attempts to find another facility to accept Mr.
Bartling were unsuccessful.174 "Plaintiffs attempted to plead a
cause of action for conspiracy to deprive Mr. Bartling of his
constitutional rights to privacy, liberty and self-determination,
in violation of Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. section
1983(3)."175 However, the court determined that that there was

no discriminatory intent on the part of the hospital. 76
WRONGFUL WITHHOLDING OF A DEAD BODY

In Strachan,17 the parents of a suicide victim who was
maintained on life support for a period of time despite the
parents' request for removal, brought suit against defendants,the
hospital and its administrator, for wrongfully withholding the
body of their dead son from burial. 78 A jury awarded the
plaintiffs $70,000 in damages on this theory.'79 The appellate
court reversed, holding that although infringement of plaintiffs'
quasi right in property to bury their dead son's body could be
redressed by an action in damages, plaintiff's right did not vest
until the life support system was disconnected.8 0 Because
defendants made the body available for burial immediately
upon disconnection of life support, the court held that
defendants committed no actionable wrongdoing.
ABUSE OF PROCESS

In some of the most egregious cases that occurred,
providers have taken affirmative action to circumvent the
directions of a health care agent by instituting guardianship
proceedings to have someone other than the agent appointed as
a decision-maker for the principle, or have improperly made a
claim of elder abuse. While these may be appropriate if the
agent is acting in bad faith, is it certainly inappropriate where
the provider simply disagrees with the agent's decisions. In this
situation, in addition to the claims pertinent to the principle, the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
Strachan,507 A.2d 718.
Id. at 723-27.
Id. at 723.

180. Id.
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agent may bring an action for abuse of process. Abuse of
process is a common law intentional tort.
Abuse of process is committed by "[olne who uses a legal
process, whether criminal or civil, against another to accomplish
a purpose for which it is not designed . .. ."

181

The elements of

abuse of process are:
(1) "a purpose other than that which the process was
designed to accomplish" 182 ; and
(2) "a subsequent misuse of the process, even though
the process was properly instituted."1 1a
The Wisconsin Supreme Court explains the elements as follows:
The essential elements of abuse of process, as the tort
has developed, have been stated to be: first, an ulterior
purpose, and second, a willful act in the use of the
process not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceeding. Some definite act or threat not authorized
by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate
in the use of the process, is required; and there is no
liability where the defendant has done nothing more
than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion,
even though with bad intentions. The improper
purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a
collater[ ]al advantage, not properly involved in the
proceeding itself,

..

. The ulterior motive or purpose

may be inferred from what is said or done about the
process, but the improper act may not be inferred from
the motive ... 184
In cases where it seems clear that the provider has taken
improper legal measures to impede an agent's authority, this
cause of action should be considered.
CONCLUSION
While acceptance of advance directives has become much wider
over the last decade, there is still a significant percentage of

181.
182.
183.
184.

Thompson v. Beecham, 241 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Wis. 1976) (citation omitted).
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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situations where an advance directive fails to meet the needs of
the client, either through statutory impediments or provider
inaction. Drafting and executing an advance directive for a
client should not be engaged in pro forma. Given the potentially
weighty decisions involved, detailed and specific language
describing your client's intentions will provide the best position
for enforcement if these documents should be challenged or an
agent's decisions ignored. Likewise, including specific language
will provide the needed foundation to overcome any statutory
obstacles to your client's plans for future health care. Active
enforcement of these documents will result in the satisfaction of
your client's goals in the most critical periods of their lives.

